Horizon (Horizon)
ReferencesAdd a reference
(No references yet)
Quotes Add a quote

Every subjective process has a process ‘horizon’, which changes with the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow--an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian meditations / Paris lectures: p. 44)

To every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollections there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized of my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian meditations / Paris lectures: p. 44-45)

The horizons are ‘predineated’ potentialities. We say also: we can ask any horizon what ‘lives in it’, we can explicate or unfold it, and ‘uncover’ the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the object sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito, though never with more then a certain degree of foreshadowing (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian meditations / Paris lectures: p. 45)

For example: the die leaves open a greed variety of thing pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already ‘construed’ in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the life, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to further determining (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself, it is precisely what makes up a ‘horizon’ (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian meditations / Paris lectures: p. 45)

Every act of experience, whatever it may be that is experienced in the proper sense as it comes into view, has eo ipso, necessarily, a knowledge and potential knowledge having reference to precisely this thing, namely, to something of it which has not yet come into view. This preknowledge is indeterminate as to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty; and were it not already manifest, the experience would not at all be experience of this one, this particular, thing. Every experience has its own horizon; every experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as 'itself-there,' it has its own horizon. This implies that every experience refers to the possibility--and it is a question here of the capacity of the ego--not only of explicating, step by step, the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity with what is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing ( : p. 32)

Thus every experience of a particular thing has its internal horizon, and by 'horizon' is meant here the induction which belongs essentially to every experience and is inseparable from it, being in the experience itself ( : p. 32)

With everything actually given, horizons are awakened; thus, if I see the front of the motionless thing-like object, I am conscious, within the horizon, of the back of the object, which I do not see. The tendency which aims at the object then it directed toward making it equally accessible from the other side. It is only with this enrichment of the given, with the penetration into particularities and the being given 'from all sides,' that the tendency passes from the initial mode of aiming at something into the mode of attainment, a mode which has its own different degrees: imperfect attainments, partial, with components of unfulfilled aim ( : p. 82-83)

The process taking place in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipation; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition—precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an object on its horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance. But this horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result ( : p. 122)

The object is pregiven with a new content of sense; it is present in consciousness with the horizon—an empty horizon, to be sure—of acquired cognitions: the precipitation of the active bestowal of sense, of the preceding allotment of the determination, is now a component of the sense of apprehension inherent in the perception, even if it not really explicated anew. But if the explication is renewed, it then has the character of a repetition and reactivation of the 'knowledge' already acquired ( : p. 123)

CommentsAdd a comment
(No comments yet)